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QUALIFIED DIVIDENDS: DO THEY AVOID
DOUBLE TAXATION OR DO THEY
DOUBLE SHAREHOLDERS' BENEFIT?
James F. Loebl*
INTRODUcTION
On May 28, 2003, President George W. Bush signed the Jobs and
Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA)' into law.
One of the most widely publicized provisions in the Act treats quali-
fied dividend income as part of net capital gain and limits the top mar-
ginal tax rate on such income to 15%.2 In addition to spurring
economic growth and creating new jobs, Congress hoped to eliminate
the economic distortions it observed in corporate decisionmaking as a
result of corporations' higher aggregate tax burden under prior law.3
The so-called dividend tax cut was temporary and would not apply to
tax years beginning after December 31, 2008. 4 In May 2006, the divi-
dend tax cut was extended for two more years, through December 31,
2010, when Congress passed the Tax Increase Prevention and Recon-
ciliation Act of 2005 (TIPRA).5
In the 2007 budget he submitted to Congress, President Bush pro-
posed that the dividend tax cut become permanent. 6 Citing growth in
gross domestic product (GDP) and employment, the President, the
* Assistant Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law; B.A., Santa Clara Uni-
versity (1978); M.B.A., Harvard Business School (1982); J.D., University of Wisconsin Law
School (1992); and LL.M., University of Florida College of Law (2000). 1 wish to thank Profes-
sors Susan Stuart, Jeremy Telman, and Elizabeth Bruch from the Valparaiso University School of
Law for their insightful comments and suggestions during the drafting of this Article.
1. Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752 (2003).
2. See I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(C), (3)(B), (11) (West 2006). Qualified dividend income includes divi-
dends received from most domestic corporations, provided the shareholder holds the stock on
which the dividend was paid for at least 60 days of the 121-day period beginning 60 days before
the stock became ex-dividend. Id. § 1(h)(11)(B). A domestic corporation is one that is "created
or organized in the United States." Id. § 7701(a)(4).
3. H.R. REP. No. 108-94, at 30-31 (2003).
4. Pub. L. No. 108-27, § 303, 117 Stat. at 764.
5. Pub. L. No. 109-222, § 102, 120 Stat. 345, 346 (2006).
6. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE
PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2007 BUDGET PROPOSAL 2-4 (2006), available at http://www.house.
gov/jct/s-1-06.pdf [hereinafter JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE
PROVISIONS].
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Department of the Treasury, and Republican congressional leaders
have actively campaigned to make the dividend tax cut permanent,
along with most of the other provisions in JGTRRA.7
This Article argues that the dividend tax cut in its present form
should be allowed to expire because it fails to eliminate the double
taxation of corporate income. This flaw could be overlooked if per-
manently extending the dividend tax cut would lead to increased eco-
nomic growth. But there is no evidence that the tax cut caused the
improvement in the economy's performance since 2003, and economic
theory suggests that the tax cut will actually lower economic growth in
the long run: A more effective means to ensure that corporate income
is taxed only once would be to implement a modified version of the
President's original proposal for dividend tax relief submitted in his
2004 budget.
Part II provides background on the problem of the double taxation
of corporate income that existed before the enactment of JGTRRA. 8
It discusses the Treasury Department's 1992 study on the integration
of corporate and individual tax systems, and it examines the Presi-
dent's original proposal to eliminate the burden of double taxation, a
proposal that was strongly influenced by the Department's report.9
Part III discusses the problem of the high percentage of corporations
paying no U.S. corporate income tax and the inadequacy of the divi-
dend tax cut as a substitute for integration. 10 Part IV explores the
likely short-term and long-term effects of the dividend tax cut on the
economy.' I Part V examines the potential cost of making the JGT-
RRA tax cuts permanent, as well as the likely distribution of the bene-
fits of those cuts among taxpayers. 12 Finally, Part VI concludes that
the dividend tax cut should be allowed to expire.' 3 A modified ver-
sion of the President's original proposal should be used if policymak-
ers still want to implement integration after further study of its costs
and benefits.
7. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INVESTING IN AMERICA'S FUTURE: REPORT OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ON THE ECONOMIC EFFEcrs OF CUTTING DIVIDEND AND
CAPITAL GAINS TAXES IN 2003 (2006), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/
report% 20on %20econ % 20of%20cap %20gains%20%20dividends%203.14.06.pdf [hereinafter
U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INVESTING IN AMERICA'S FUTURE].
8. See infra notes 14-23 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 24-52 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 53-77 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 78-213 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 214-232 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 233-241 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Problem of Double Taxation
Traditionally, the income of a so-called C corporation14 has been
subject to taxation at two levels. First, the corporation paid tax apply-
ing the rate schedule in § 11(b) of the Internal Revenue Code.15 Sec-
ond, prior to the enactment of JGTRRA, when the corporation
distributed its earnings in the form of dividends to shareholders, the
individual shareholders reported the dividends as ordinary income 1
6
on their individual income tax returns and paid tax on the dividends at
their marginal tax rate. A simple example illustrates that the two
taxes could combine for a very high marginal tax rate in the absence
of any relief provision:
EXAMPLE 1
Assume that ABC Corporation earns $100 in taxable income and
then distributes all of its after-tax income as dividends to its share-
holders. Assume also that ABC must apply the top statutory in-
come tax rate for corporations, or 35%,17 to determine its corporate
income tax liability, and that its shareholders' marginal tax rate is
the top rate for individuals, which is also currently 35%.18
Step 1: Determine the corporate income tax
Taxable income $100.00
x tax rate x 35%
Tax liability $ 35.00
Step 2: Determine after-tax income available for distribution
to shareholders
Pre-tax income $100.00
Less corporate income tax
After-tax income $ 65.00
Step 3: Determine the shareholders' individual income tax on
the dividends received
Dividends $ 65.00
x tax rate x35%
Shareholders' individual income tax $ 22.75
14. The corporations are known as C corporations because the provisions contained in Sub-
chapter C of Chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code govern the taxation of their income.
Subchapter C includes §§ 301-385 of the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. §§ 301-385 (West
2006).
15. All statutory citations are to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as amended
through June 30, 2006, unless otherwise noted.
16. Ordinary income includes items such as salaries and wages, rent, interest, and income
from a sole proprietorship.
17. I.R.C. § 11(b)(1)(D).
18. Id. § 1(i)(2).
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Step 4: Determine total income taxes paid
Corporate income tax $ 35.00
Individual income tax + 22.75
Total income taxes $ 57.75
Step 5: Determine combined marginal tax rate
Total income taxes = $ 57.75 = 57.75%
Pre-tax income $100.00
As Example 1 illustrates, the traditional. double tax regime had
been one of the major disadvantages of organizing a business as a cor-
poration. Companies like the hypothetical ABC Corporation had
taken various measures to avoid paying a nearly 58% tax on each dol-
lar of taxable corporate income. The first measure was to retain the
$65 in after-tax income to use in financing future investments, rather
than distributing the income to shareholders. While the shareholders
did not receive any current return on their investment in the form of
dividends, they avoided paying $22.75 in tax in the current year. But
not all of the $22.75 in tax would necessarily be avoided on a perma-
nent basis. Theoretically, the earnings retained by ABC would in-
crease the net assets of the firm and thus the value of its stock. When
the shareholders sold their stock, they would have to pay tax on the
gain. Net capital gains are currently taxed at a maximum rate of 15%,
which is lower than the top rate on ordinary income. 19
The second measure corporations took to avoid double taxation
was to finance investments with debt rather than equity. While divi-
dends are not deductible for corporate income tax purposes, corpora-
tions may deduct the interest expense they incur on borrowed funds
under § 163(a). Therefore, when a corporation pays interest to a
lender, the corporation saves taxes in an amount equal to the tax rate
multiplied by the amount of the interest expense. This compares fa-
vorably to the rate paid when the corporation pays a dividend, be-
cause the corporation saves no tax, and the amount paid is the cost to
the corporation both before and after tax.
Finally, when faced with the C corporation's double taxation re-
gime, entrepreneurs often decided to organize their businesses as ei-
ther limited liability companies, limited partnerships, or general
partnerships. These organizational forms are all taxed as partnerships
19. See id. § 1(h)(1)(B)-(C). For taxpayers whose ordinary income would be taxed at a mar-
ginal rate of 10% or 15%, the 15% rate for net capital gain provides no tax break. Accordingly,
§ 1(h)(1)(B) provides that net capital gain reported by those taxpayers is taxed at a rate of 5%.
From 2008 to 2010, the net capital gain tax rate will be reduced from 5% to zero. See id.
§ 1(h)(1)(B); Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-222,
§ 102, 120 Stat. 345, 346 (2006).
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under Subchapter K. 20 Partnerships are referred to as "pass-through"
entities because the partnership itself does not pay tax. Instead, each
partner reports a share of the partnership's income, deductions, gains,
losses, and credits on the partner's individual income tax return.21
Owners could also form corporations but elect "small business corpo-
ration" or "S corporation" status, allowing them to be treated as pass-
through entities.22 Since corporations with more than 100 sharehold-
ers may not elect to be taxed under Subchapter S, large publicly held
corporations must be taxed as C corporations. 23
B. The Treasury Department Study
The problem of double taxation and the responses developed by
corporate managers and business owners to avoid it have long been a
concern of the Treasury Department. Pursuant to a mandate in the
Tax Reform Act of 198624 to study reforms in corporate taxation
under Subchapter C, the Treasury Department issued a lengthy report
in 1992 discussing the problems of economic inefficiency created by
the classical corporate tax structure, as well as the need to integrate
individual and corporate income taxes to resolve these problems.25
The Treasury Department noted three economic distortions in the
corporate system. First, the system caused a misallocation of capital
between the corporate and noncorporate sectors. For a corporation to
achieve the same after-tax rate of return on its investments as a
noncorporate business, it must achieve a higher pre-tax rate of return
than the noncorporate business. The need for a higher pre-tax rate of
return raises the relative cost of capital for corporations; it thus dis-
courages corporations from investing in projects that would otherwise
be profitable if they were subject to one level of tax.26 Noncorporate
businesses, meanwhile, could invest in projects whose returns exceed
the noncorporate sector's cost of capital but are lower than those on
projects rejected by corporations. 27 The Treasury Department con-
cluded that the "bias against corporate sector investments compared
20. I.R.C. §§ 701-777.
21. Id. §§ 701-702.
22. Id. §§ 1361-1379.
23. See id. § 1361(b)(1)(A).
24. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
25. U.S. DEP'T. OF THE TREASURY, REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ON
INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME
ONCE i-iv (1992), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/integration-paper/
integration.pdf [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T. OF THE TREASURY, TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE].
26. Id. at 3-4.
27. Id.
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with investments in the noncorporate sector reduces the productivity
of the nation's capital investments and reduces potential national
income.'"28
The second distortion of the double tax system was to encourage
corporations to finance more of their new investments by using debt
rather than equity. By increasing their levels of debt, corporations
also increased the "risk of financial distress or bankruptcy. '29
Finally, the Treasury Department noted that the traditional system
of taxation distorted the choice between distributing earnings to
shareholders and reinvesting them in the business. Furthermore,
when corporations chose to distribute earnings, the taxation system
encouraged corporations to repurchase shareholder stock rather than
distribute dividends. Repurchases produced more favorable results at
the shareholder level because the shareholder paid tax only on the
gain (the excess of the repurchase price over the shareholder's basis in
the shares) rather than on the total amount of the dividend distrib-
uted, and because the gain could be taxed at a lower rate than the
dividend if it were a long-term capital gain.30
After identifying these problems, the Treasury Department dis-
cussed four different prototypes to implement the integration of the
corporate and individual tax systems, to reduce distortions in the sys-
tem, to improve economic efficiency, and to ensure that capital in-
come would be taxed only once. One of these prototypes, the
dividend exclusion prototype, formed the basis for President Bush's
February 2003 budget proposal to eliminate the double taxation of
corporate income.31
C. President Bush's Proposal
Under existing law, a distribution of cash or property by a corpora-
tion to its shareholders constitutes a dividend if the distribution is
deemed to have been made from the corporation's current or accumu-
lated earnings and profits (E&P).32 While E&P are analogous to the
retained earnings reported on a company's balance sheet, they are in-
tended to measure the corporation's ability to pay dividends based on
28. Id. at 4.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 11.
31. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FIs-
CAL YEAR 2004 REVENUE PROPOSALS 11-22 (2003), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/
tax-policy/library/bluebk03.pdf [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL
EXPLANATIONS].
32. I.R.C. § 316(a)(1)-(2) (West 2006).
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the economic gains and losses it has experienced. 33 Accordingly,
§ 312 specifies the items, such as depreciation, 34 that are treated dif-
ferently for purposes of computing E&P than for computing taxable
income. President Bush's proposal did not change the definition of a
dividend or the rules for maintaining E&P accounts.
The President's budget for the fiscal year 200435 proposed that divi-
dends distributed to individual shareholders should be excluded from
their gross income to the extent that the dividends were "paid out of
income previously taxed at the corporate level."' 36 To keep track of
the income that could be distributed without further tax at the individ-
ual shareholder level, a corporation would have to calculate an "ex-
cludable dividend amount" (EDA) every calendar year. 37 The
corporation would determine the EDA under the following formula:
U.S. income taxes - U.S. income taxes38
0.35
In the first part of the formula, the corporation converts the amount
of U.S. income taxes shown on the return from the previous calendar
year into an equivalent amount of taxable income that has been taxed
at the maximum statutory rate of 35%. 39 To obtain this equivalent
amount of taxable income, the corporation divides the amount of
taxes shown on the return by the 35% rate. In the second part, the
corporation subtracts the taxes shown on the return from the hypo-
thetical taxable income calculated in the first part. The result is the
EDA. The following example illustrates the use of the formula:
EXAMPLE 2
Assume that GHI Corporation filed a return on September 15,
2005, reporting U.S. income taxes of $700,000. GHI's EDA for cal-
endar year 2006 would be $1,300,000:
33. See id. § 312(n) ("Adjustments to earnings and profits to more accurately reflect economic
gain and loss.").
34. Id. § 312(k).
35. In discussions of budgets, all references to years mean fiscal years unless otherwise noted.
36. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS, supra note 31, at 12.
37. Id. at 13.
38. Id.
39. Although the corporate income tax rate schedule is progressive and contains four tax
brackets and two surcharges, the President's proposal, like the Treasury Department's dividend
exclusion prototype, sought to simplify the EDA calculation by assuming that all corporate taxa-
ble income is taxed at the top rate (currently 35%). See I.R.C. § 11(b). As a result of the
surcharges, for every corporation with taxable income in excess of $18,333,333, the tax liability
before adjustments for credits and penalty taxes may be calculated by multiplying the taxable
income by 35%.
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$700,000 - $700,000
0.35
= $2,000,000. - $700,000
= $1,300,000
Each year, shareholders would be able to exclude dividends re-
ceived from the corporation to the extent of the corporation's EDA.
In Example 2, GHI's shareholders would be able to exclude from
their gross income up to $1,300,000 in dividends distributed by the
corporation in 2006. But what would happen if GHI chose to dis-
tribute only $1,000,000 in dividends during calendar year 2006? Be-
cause dividend distributions would reduce the EDA on a dollar-for-
dollar basis, there would still be an EDA at the end of 2006. Under
the proposal, any unused EDA generally could not be carried over to
2007.40 To prevent the permanent loss of a potential $300,000 tax ben-
efit to GHI shareholders, the proposal permitted GHI to report to the
shareholders that they should increase the basis of their GHI stock by
a total of $300,000.41 The Administration's proposal required a corpo-
ration to keep track of the total of such basis adjustments in a Cumu-
lative Retained Earnings Basis Adjustment (CREBA) account. 42
Permitting an increase in basis would accomplish two objectives.
First, it would prevent earnings retained in the business from being
taxed a second time when the shareholder sold the stock. As noted
above, the retained earnings would increase the firm's net assets, and
thus the amount realized by the shareholder on a sale of the stock.
Since a gain or loss on the sale is determined by subtracting the share-
holder's basis in the stock from the amount realized on the sale, the
retained earnings would either increase the gain or decrease the loss
the shareholder reported. An increase in basis for a proportionate
share of the corporation's earnings would offset the impact of those
earnings on the amount realized. Second, the basis adjustment would
allow corporate managers to focus on economic considerations-not
simply tax considerations-in setting dividend policy.
If a corporation distributed dividends in excess of its EDA in a
given year, the proposal specified how distributed amounts should be
treated by the corporation and its shareholders. First, the corporation
would reduce its EDA to zero. 43 Shareholders would exclude an
amount of dividends equal to the EDA from their gross income. Sec-
40. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS, supra note 31, at 14.
41. Id. at 13-14. GHI would use a Form 1099 to report to each shareholder the amount of the
shareholder's excludable dividends and basis adjustments. Id. at 19.
42. Id. at 14-15.
43. Id. at 15.
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ond, the corporation would use the excess of the dividends paid over
the EDA to reduce its CREBA, but not below zero.44 The corpora-
tion would have to advise shareholders to reduce the basis of their
stock.45 The total amount by which shareholders would reduce their
basis would equal the amount by which the corporation reduced its
CREBA, but no shareholder could reduce the basis below zero.46 If
the basis reduction reported by the corporation exceeded the share-
holder's basis, the shareholder would have to report capital gain. 47
Third, if the total dividends distributed exceeded the sum of the EDA
and the CREBA, the excess would be treated by shareholders as taxa-
ble dividends. 48 The taxable dividends would be taxed at each share-
holder's marginal tax rate for ordinary income. The following
example illustrates how these provisions operate:
EXAMPLE 3
Assume that, in 2006, GHI Corporation from Example 2 (1) had an
EDA of $1,300,000, (2) distributed $1,000,000 in dividends, (3) re-
ported to shareholders that they should increase their basis by a
total of $300,000, and (4) had a CREBA at the end of 2006 of
$500,000.
In 2007, GHI had $400,000 in EDA and distributed $1,000,000 in
dividends to its shareholders. At all times in 2006 and 2007, there
were 100,000 shares of outstanding stock. One shareholder, M,
bought 100 shares for $20 each on January 2, 2006 and held those
shares throughout 2006 and 2007.
2006:
The corporation would have advised the shareholders to increase
their basis by $3.00 per share ($300,000 total increase in basis -
100,000 shares outstanding). Shareholder M would have increased
the basis from $20 to $23 per share.
2007:
(1) GHI would reduce its EDA to zero. Its shareholders would
exclude the first $400,000 of dividends received from their
gross income.
(2) GHI would reduce its CREBA to zero. It would then advise
shareholders that they must reduce the basis of their stock. As
the CREBA was reduced by $500,000, shareholders would
44. Id.
45. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS, supra note 31, at 15.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. This assumes that the distributions in excess of the EDA and CREBA would be
deemed to have been made from the corporation's current or accumulated earnings and profits.
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
2007] 1147
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
have to reduce their basis by $500,000. The basis reduction per
share would be $5.00. Shareholder M reduces the basis from
$23 per share to $18 per share.
(3) GHI's dividends of $1,000,000 exceed the sum of the EDA and
CREBA by $100,000. The $100,000, or $1.00 per share, must
be treated as taxable dividends by the shareholders. Share-
holder M has $100 in taxable dividends that must be reported
as ordinary income.
In addition to economic efficiency, the President's proposal stated
that ending double taxation would "reduce incentives for certain types
of corporate tax planning" and "enhance corporate governance by
eliminating the current bias against the payment of dividends. '49 The
logic of the latter statement is that increased dividends reduce the fi-
nancing of investments with retained earnings, which often receive
less scrutiny than investments funded by new equity or debt
financing.50
The President's proposal might have accomplished the goal of tax-
ing corporate income "once and only once,"' 51 but achieving this goal
would come at a high price. The proposal estimated a reduction in
revenue of $152.7 billion over the five-year period, 2004-2008, and
$385.4 billion over the ten-year period, 2004-2013.52 The drastic re-
duction in tax revenues, and the complexity of administering the basis
adjustments, led Congress to draft the current version of § 1(h)(11),
which taxes qualified dividends at a maximum rate of 15%.
III. QUALIFIED DIVIDENDS ARE AN INADEQUATE
SUBSTITUTE FOR INTEGRATION
As the Treasury Department noted in its 1992 study, integration of
the corporate and individual tax systems would lessen, if not elimi-
nate, the distortions caused by the classical corporate tax structure,
including the misallocation of capital between corporate and
noncorporate sectors, the preference for debt over equity in financing
new investments, and the preference for retaining earnings rather
than distributing dividends.5 3 The study also indicated that integra-
tion might be necessary to prevent American corporations from being
placed at a competitive disadvantage, because many U.S. trading part-
49. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS, supra note 31, at 12.
50. Id. at 11-12.
51. Id. at 12.
52. Id. at 22.
53. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE, supra note 25, at
vii-viii, 12-13.
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ners have already changed their tax systems to achieve some degree of
integration. 54
This Part focuses on the dividend tax cut as a means of achieving
the integration of corporate and individual tax systems. Consistent
with the principle that corporate income should be taxed fully at least
once, the tax on such income must be paid either at the corporation's
marginal tax rate when the income is earned, or at the individual
shareholder's marginal tax rate when the corporation distributes the
income in the form of a dividend. Applying, this standard, it is clear
that the dividend tax cut is a flawed device for achieving integration.
While corporations with taxable income in excess of $10 million are
subject to a marginal income tax rate of 35%, a study by the General
Accounting Office (GAO) 55 and a joint study by the Citizens for Tax
Justice and the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy 56 have
shown that a significant number of corporations reporting pre-tax in-
come in excess of $10 million in their financial statements are report-
ing little or no corporate income tax liability. The GAO compared the
tax liabilities reported by U.S.-controlled corporations (USCCs) with
those reported by foreign-controlled corporations (FCCs) during the
period 1996-2000. 57 The GAO found, on average, that 61% of
USCCs and 71% of FCCs reported no tax liability during the years
studied.58 The GAO also examined the data for "large" USCCs and
FCCs, which were defined as companies with $250 million in assets or
$50 million in gross receipts in constant 2000 dollars.59 According to
the GAO, large corporations comprised only 1% of all corporations in
the study but accounted for "over 93 percent of all assets reported on
corporate returns. '60 On average, 38% of large USCCs and 32% of
large FCCs reported no tax liability during the years 1996-2000.61
54. Id. at 1-2.
55. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: COMPARISON OF THE RE-
PORTED TAX LIABILITIES OF FOREIGN-AND U.S.-CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS, 1996-2000
(2004), available 7t http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04358.pdf [hereinafter GAO, TAX
ADMINISTRATION].
56. ROBERT S. MCINTYRE & T.D. Coo NGUYEN, CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE & THE INST. ON
TAXATION & ECON. POL'Y, CORPORATE INCOME TAXES IN THE BUSH YEARS (2004), available at
http://www.ctj.org/corpfed04an.pdf.
57. See GAO, TAX ADMINISTRATION, supra note 55, at 2. A foreign-controlled corporation
"is either a foreign corporation or a U.S. corporation with 50 percent or more of its voting stock
owned by a foreign person or entity." Id. at 3.
58. Id. at 2.
59. Id. app. I at 17 tbl.6.
60. Id. at 2.
61. Id. app. I at 17 tbl.6.
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The joint study by Robert McIntyre (of the Citizens for Tax Justice)
and T.D. Nguyen (of the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy)
focused on a sample of 275 firms selected from Fortune's 2004 list of
the 500 largest corporations in America that were profitable during all
three years of the period, 2001-2003.62 Together, the 275 companies
reported nearly $1.1 trillion in pre-tax profits to their shareholders
over the three years.63 If they had paid tax at the statutory rate of
35% on these financial statement profits,64 these companies "would
have paid $370 billion in income taxes over the three years. ' 65 McIn-
tyre and Nguyen determined that these corporations paid just over
half that amount, and that their effective tax rate over the three years
was only 18.4%.66 A further breakdown of the data reveals a signifi-
cant decline in the effective tax rate for the 275 companies, from
21.4% in 2001 to 17.2% in 2002-2003.67
McIntyre and Nguyen also discovered that, despite being profitable
in each of the three years, 82 of the companies either reported no tax
liability or received tax refunds in at least one of the three years.68 In
the years that these companies reported no liability or received re-
funds, they reported pre-tax financial accounting income of $102 bil-
lion. 69 But rather than pay a total of $35.6 billion in taxes at the 35%
statutory rate, these companies actually received refunds totaling
$12.6 billion.70 Further, the trend in reporting pre-tax profit to share-
holders while reporting no tax liability appears to be on the rise. Mc-
Intyre and Nguyen noted that the number of companies so situated in
the study increased from 33 in 2001 to 46 in 2003. 71
Given the differences in measuring corporate income between gen-
erally accepted accounting principles and the Internal Revenue Code,
the dichotomy between corporate financial statements and tax returns
established by the two studies will likely persist. For example, while
corporations may record depreciation on a straight-line basis in deter-
62. See MCINTYRE & NGUYEN, supra note 56, at 1.
63. Id.
64. See supra note 39.
65. See MCINTYRE & NGUYEN, supra note 56, at 4.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 3.
68. Id. Although a corporation may report financial accounting profit in the current year, it is
possible that the corporation may report a loss on its income tax return and be able to carry the
loss back to a period in which it reported taxable income and paid taxes. See I.R.C. § 172 (West
2006). The tax loss carryback results in the government issuing a full or partial refund of taxes
paid in a prior tax year. See id. § 6511(d)(2).
69. See MCINTYRE & NGUYEN, supra note 56, at 3.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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mining accounting income, § 168 permits them to expense the cost of
equipment used in the business more rapidly for tax purposes. 72 Simi-
larly, the deduction for qualified production activities under § 199
lowers taxable income but not accounting income. 73
But the differences in income measurement are not the only causes
of the discrepancy. Corporations can avail themselves of numerous
tax credits, which may completely offset the tentative tax liability de-
termined by applying the statutory 35% rate to the corporation's taxa-
ble income. 74 Some of the activities that qualify for credits include
increasing research activities, providing child care for employees, pro-
viding affordable housing, and producing electricity from renewable
resources. As noted by McIntyre and Nguyen, some corporations
have become the "unexpected beneficiaries" of these credits.75 For
instance, Marriot International operated four coal-based synthetic
fuel facilities and received credits of $159 million in 2002 and $233
million in 2003, while Kimberly-Clark and Clorox saved $115 million
and $36 million, respectively, through investments in affordable
housing. 76
Based on these studies and the current structure of the corporate
tax system, it is clear that a substantial number-if not the majority-
of large publicly held corporations will not pay income tax at their
marginal rate. In many cases, in order for corporate income to be
taxed fully at least once, it would have to be taxed at the shareholder's
marginal tax rate. The qualified dividend income provisions, however,
ensure that dividends are taxed at rates lower than the shareholder's
marginal tax rate for ordinary income (either 5% or 15%).77 As a
result, the qualified dividend provision violates the principle of taxing
income fully at least once. Based on the studies, it would be possible
for a significant number of corporations to avoid having income taxed
at the corporate level and instead be taxed only once, at a maximum
rate of 15%.
Because the income of many corporations is taxed at only 15%,
while the income of noncorporate pass-through entities is taxed at the
marginal rates of their owners, capital for funding new projects could
now be misallocated in favor of the corporate sector. As many
noncorporate entities are small entrepreneurial businesses that gener-
72. I.R.C. § 168.
73. Id. § 199.
74. See id. §§ 38-45F (falling under the heading "Subpart D-Business Related Credits").
75. See MCINTYRE & NGUYEN, supra note 56, at 10.
76. Id.
77. See supra note 19.
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ate employment and technological innovation, such a misallocation
would have negative consequences for the economy. Thus, just as
double taxation constitutes bad policy because of the distortions it
causes in capital allocation, taxing corporate income at lower rates
compared to other forms of business enterprise may also be unwise
policy.
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE DIVIDEND TAX CUT ON
ECONOMIC GROWTH
The Bush Administration has argued that the dividend tax cut
should become permanent because it has promoted strong economic
growth over the past three years and will continue to do so in the
future. To evaluate the merits of this argument, this Part begins with a
discussion of the Administration's assessment of the dividend tax cut.
Next, two competing views of dividend taxation-the old view and the
new view-are presented. These views have significant implications
for dividend tax policy. Finally, this Part examines the likely effects
the dividend tax relief has had in the short run, and would have in the
long run, if it were extended permanently.
A. The Bush Administration's Assessment
In 2006, the Administration issued three key reports to support its
economic argument in favor of the dividend tax cut. The Treasury
Department issued the first of these reports in March, 78 in conjunction
with a conference it hosted on "preserving the lower tax rates on divi-
dends and capital gains. '' 79 The second report was the Mid-session
Review of the 2007 budget released by the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) on July 11, 2006.80 The third report, 81 a "dynamic
analysis" of the long-term economic effects of the tax breaks under
JGTRRA and the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation
78. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INVESTING IN AMERICA'S FUTURE, supra note 7.
79. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury to Host Tax Relief Symposium Invest-
ing in America's Future-Preserving the Lower Tax Rates on Dividends and Capital Gains
(Mar. 10, 2006), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/s4112.htm. JGTRRA lowered the rates
on long-term capital gains, other than collectibles gains and unrecaptured § 1250 gains, from
20% and 10%, to 15% and 5%, respectively. See I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(B)-(C). For 2008 through
2010, the 5% rate is reduced to zero. See supra note 19.
80. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, MID-SESSION REVIEW: FISCAL YEAR 2007 BUDGET OF THE
U.S. GOVERNMENT (2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omblbudget/fy2007/pdf/
07msr.pdf.
81. OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF
PERMANENT EXTENSION OF THE PRESIDENT'S TAX RELIEF (2006), available at http://www.treas.
gov/press/releases/reports/treasurydynamicanalysisreporjjuly252006.pdf [hereinafter OFFICE OF
TAX ANALYSIS, DYNAMIC ANALYSIS].
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Act of 2001 (EGTRRA), 82 was released by the Treasury Department
on July 25, 2006.
1. The Treasury Department's Report on the Economic Effects of
the Dividend and Capital Gains Tax Cuts
According to the Treasury Department, the purpose of the dividend
and capital gains tax cuts was to eliminate the double taxation of cor-
porate income. 83 By reducing marginal effective tax rates on corpo-
rate income, the cuts would also reduce the cost of capital for the
corporate sector and the economy as a whole, leading to increases in
investment, capital formation, and labor productivity over the long
term.84 Eliminating double taxation would result in a more efficient
allocation of capital between the corporate sector and other sectors of
the economy; it would reduce the corporate bias toward financing
projects with debt rather than equity, as well as the bias toward retain-
ing earnings rather than distributing dividends.85 Based on the find-
ings of the Treasury Department's 1992 study, the gain in efficiency
and the reduction in bias could eventually increase economic welfare
by as much as "0.5 percent of national consumption, or about $43 bil-
lion per year (in 2005 dollars)."' 86 But the Treasury Department rec-
ognized that the two tax cuts did not completely eliminate double
taxation, so "the economic gains [would be] likely smaller than esti-
mated in the 1992 Treasury Integration Study."'87
After discussing the economic rationale for the cuts, the Treasury
Department turned to the performance of the economy since the cuts
were enacted. First, it noted that dividends paid by companies in-
cluded in the Standard and Poor's 500 Index (S&P 500) totaled $203
billion in 2005, representing a 36.5% increase from the amounts dis-
tributed in 2002.88 In addition, the S&P 500 rose approximately 40%
in the three years following the announcement of the President's pro-
82. Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001). The tax breaks enacted under EGTRRA included
significant reductions in the four highest marginal tax rates on ordinary income over a 5-year
period, the repeal of the estate tax in 2010, an increase in the child tax credit to $1,000, and relief
from the so-called marriage penalty. For an excellent summary of the provisions enacted under
EGTRRA and JGTRRA, see CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTIVE FEDERAL TAX RATES
UNDER CURRENT LAW, 2001 TO 2314, at 8-9 tbl.1 (2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/
ftpdocs/57xx/doc5746/08-13-EffectiveFedTaxRates.pdf.,
83. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INVESTING IN AMERICA'S FUTURE, supra note 7, at 3.
84. Id. at 3-5.
85. Id. at 5-6; see also supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
86. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INVESTING IN AMERICA'S FUTURE, supra note 7, at 6.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 8.
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posals to alleviate double taxation. 89 While the Treasury Department
acknowledged that many factors contributed to the stock market gain,
it stated that "the dividend and capital gains tax cuts likely played an
important role," citing a study that estimated a 6% increase in aggre-
gate market value due to the two provisions. 90
Next, the Treasury Department examined growth in real private
nonresidential investment. While such investment had declined for
nine consecutive quarters prior to the second quarter of 2003, it grew
at an average annualized rate of 8.7% over the next eleven quarters
(from the second quarter of 2003 through the fourth quarter of
2005).91 But the Treasury Department admitted that it could not iden-
tify the precise impact of the dividend tax cut because other factors
could have influenced investment, including tax breaks such as bonus
depreciation. 92 Furthermore, it acknowledged that dividend taxation
may not affect the investment decisions of corporations that finance
projects through retained earnings, which would lessen the impact of
the dividend tax cut on investment growth throughout the economy.93
89. Id. at 9. The President announced his proposals on January 7, 2003. See Press Release,
Office of the Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet: President Bush Taking Action to Strengthen America's
Economy (Jan. 7, 2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030107.htm.
90. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INVESTING IN AMERICA'S FUTURE, supra note 7, at 9 (cit-
ing James Poterba, Taxation and Corporate Payout Policy, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 171, 171-75
(2004)).
91. Id. On July 28, 2006, the Bureau of Economic Analysis released its annual revision of the
national income and product accounts (NIPAs), which affected quarterly estimates of GDP, cor-
porate profits, and personal income for the first quarter of 2003 through the first quarter of 2006.
See Press Release, Bureau of Econ. Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, National Income and
Product Accounts 4 (July 28, 2006), http://www.bea.govfbea/newsrelarchive/2006/gdp206a.pdf
[hereinafter Press Release, National Income]. The tables contain the previously published esti-
mates as well as the revised estimates. Based on an arithmetic average of the revised growth
rates, real private nonresidential investment grew at an average annualized rate of 6.6% during
the eleven-quarter period, rather than 8.7%. See id. at 11 tbl.1A.
92. The Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002 (JCWAA) permitted taxpayers, in
the year they placed certain qualified property in service, to deduct 30% of the property's ad-
justed basis in addition to the depreciation deduction which would otherwise be allowable under
other provisions of Chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code. Pub. L. No. 107-147, § 101(a), 116
Stat. 21, 22 (2002). Taxpayers would subtract the 30% "bonus" depreciation from the adjusted
basis to calculate the remaining basis that would be subject to the regular depreciation deduc-
tion. Id. Generally, property was qualified if it had been acquired between September 10, 2001,
and September 11, 2004, and placed in service before January 1, 2005. Id. at 23. JGTRRA
increased the bonus depreciation to 50% of the adjusted basis for property acquired between
May 5, 2003 and January 1, 2005, and placed in service before January 1, 2005. Pub. L. No. 108-
27, § 201(a), 117 Stat. 752, 756 (2003).
93. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INVESTING IN AMERICA'S FUTURE, supra note 7, at 9-10.
The Treasury Department is alluding to the fact that in corporate finance and economics, there
are two views of the effects of dividend taxation-an old view and a new view. Firms that fi-
nance their projects through retained earnings fit within the new view. For a discussion of the
two views and their implications for dividend tax policy, see infra Part IV.B.
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Finally, the Treasury Department looked at the growth in GDP and
employment. It found that GDP grew at an average annualized rate
of 3.9% in the ten quarters following the enactment of JGTRRA
(from the third quarter of 2003 through the fourth quarter of 2005), a
rate which was "dramatically" faster than the average annualized rate
of 1.1% for the nine quarters preceding enactment (from the first
quarter of 2001 through the first quarter of 2003).94 With respect to
employment, "approximately 4.7 million jobs have been created since
[JGTRRA] became law."'95 Again, the Treasury Department could
not separate the effects of cutting dividend and capital gains taxes
from other factors that might have influenced either GDP or employ-
ment. It concluded, however, that the dividend and capital gains tax
cuts "likely contributed" to the accelerated growth in GDP.96
2. OMB's Mid-session Review
With the release of the Mid-session Review in July 2006, the OMB
announced that it projected the budget deficit for 2006 to be $296 bil-
lion, or $127 billion lower than the $423 billion forecasted in February
2006.9 7 The improvement was due primarily to a $115 billion increase
in expected total tax receipts, reflecting higher-than-anticipated col-
lections of corporate and individual income taxes in the first eight
months of 2006.98 While the OMB credited the President's tax poli-
cies for "stimulating and sustaining a strong economy," it provided no
data or analysis of the effects the dividend tax cut has had on eco-
nomic growth. 99
But the Mid-session Review is a pivotal report in the campaign to
extend the dividend tax cut, as well as the other EGTRRA and JGT-
RRA tax breaks, for two reasons. First, its revenue projections re-
vived the debate about whether the government is collecting more tax
receipts than it would if the tax cuts had not been enacted. The tax
94. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INVESTING IN AMERICA'S FUTURE, supra note 7, at 10.
Based on the revisions to the NIPAs on July 28, 2006, the average annualized growth rate for the
ten quarters since JGTRRA's enactment would be 3.7%. See Press Release, National Income,
supra note 91, at 11 tbl.lA.
95. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INVESTING IN AMERICA'S FUTURE, supra note 7, at 10.
96. Id. The Treasury Department cited a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimate re-
garding the effects of the President's proposed budget for 2004 on employment, and its own
study using a Macroeconomic Advisers model to determine how many fewer jobs would have
been created in 2003 and 2004 if none of the tax cuts in EGTRRA, JCWAA, and JGTRRA had
been enacted. Id. at 11.
97. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 80, at 1.
98. Id. at 5.
99. Id. at 2.
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cuts, in other words, might be paying for themselves.1°° Second, the
Mid-session Review indicated that the Treasury Department had con-
ducted a dynamic analysis and determined that, if the EGTRAA and
JGTRRA provisions weremade!permanent, national income could in-
crease by 0.7% in the Ong run.10 1
3. The Treasury Department's Dynamic Analysis
When the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) and the Treasury De-
partment's Office of Tax Analysis prepare official revenue estimates
for a tax proposal, they assume that the tax changes do not affect
GDP.10 2 Thus, the process of developing these estimates is sometimes
referred to as "static scoring. ' 103 To gauge the changes in gross na-
tional product (GNP), investment, employment, and other major
macroeconomic variables attributable to the extension of the tax cuts,
the Treasury Department conducted a so-called dynamic analysis. 1° 4
The Treasury Department assumed that the decline in tax revenues
over the ten-year budget window (2007-2016 for the 2007 budget)
would be financed through the issuance of additional government
debt.105 Starting in 2017, the tax cuts would have to be financed by
one of two mechanisms: (1) adjusting government consumption
spending to freeze the government debt-to-GNP ratio at the level that
100. At the press conference on the Mid-session Review, the President- made the following
statement: "Some in Washington say we had to choose between cutting taxes and cutting the
deficit.... Today's numbers show that that was a false choice. The economic growth fueled by
tax relief has helped send our tax revenues soaring." News Release, Office of the Press Sec'y,
President Discusses Mid-session Review (July 11, 2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/re-
leases/2006/07/20060711-1.html. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities noted this comment
and other remarks by the President and Vice President in its analysis of the issue. See RICHARD
KOGAN & AvIVA ARON-DINE, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES, CLAIM THAT TAX CUTS
"PAY FOR THEMSELVES" Is Too GOOD TO BE TRUE: DATA SHOW No "FREE LUNCH" HERE 1
(2006), available at http://www.cbpp.org/3-8-06tax.pdf.
101. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 80, at 3-4. The analysis did not incorporate
the permanent repeal of the estate tax. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
102. JASON FURMAN, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES, A SHORT GUIDE TO DYNAMIC
SCORING 4 (2006), available at http://www.cbpp.org/7-12-06bud2.pdf.
103. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the JCT and the Office of Tax Analy-
sis do incorporate microeconomic behavioral changes into their analysis; these include shifts in
the timing of income and shifts in compensation from nontaxable fringe benefits to taxable
wages. Id. at 3. Economist Jason Furman believes that a more appropriate description of esti-
mating revenues associated with tax proposals would be "dynamic micro, although static macro
scoring." Id. at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
104. See OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, DYNAMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 81. While foreign invest-
ment in the domestic economy would cause an increase in GDP, some of the increase would
have to be returned to the foreign providers of capital. Therefore, the Treasury analyzed
changes in real GNP because it "more accurately reflects the resources available to U.S. citi-
zens." Id. at 10 n.21.
105. Id. at 6.
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would exist in 2017, or (2) adjusting all income tax rates proportion-
ally in each period after 2016 to freeze the government debt-to-GNP
ratio at the level that would exist in 2017.106
The Treasury Department separated the tax breaks into three
groups to identify the economic effects: (1) the dividend and capital
gains tax cuts; (2) the reduction in the top four tax rates on ordinary
income for individuals; and (3) the child tax credit of $1,000, the re-
duction in marriage penalties, and the 10% tax rate on ordinary in-
come.10 7 The groups were tested on a cumulative basis (the first
group alone, followed by the first and second groups, and then all
three groups) under each of the two financing options mentioned
above.
The report indicates that if the tax cuts were financed with a reduc-
tion in government spending starting in 2017, then extending the divi-
dend and capital gains tax cuts would increase real GNP by 0.4% in
the long run.10 8 This means that at some point in the future, 10 9 GNP
would be higher by approximately $50 billion dollars (in 2006 dollars)
each year in perpetuity as a result of making the cuts permanent. 110 If
the two tax cuts were financed through a tax increase starting in 2017,
real GNP would increase 0.3% in the long run.11' The report also
shows that if the three groups of tax cuts were permanently extended,
real GNP would increase by 0.7% in the long run, as long as the cuts
were financed through a spending reduction.'1 2 On the other hand, if
the cuts were financed through a tax increase, real GNP would de-
crease by 0.9%. 113
106. Id. at 6-7.
107. Id. at 6. The Treasury Department did not include the permanent repeal of the estate
tax, which is part of the President's budget proposal for 2007. Id. at 6 n.6. It stated that "[tihere
is considerable uncertainty regarding the likely behavioral responses to repealing the estate tax,"
and its inflexible model was not very capable of capturing the likely range of responses. OFFICE
OF TAX ANALYSIS, DYNAMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 81, at 6 n.6.
108. Id. at 10, 20 tbl.3.
109. The report does not specify what is meant by the long run. It could take twenty years or
more to achieve the additional GNP.
110. See Press Release, Remarks by Robert Carroll, Deputy Assistant Sec'y for Tax Analysis,
U.S. Department of the Treasury Before the National Economists Club (July 27, 2006), http://
www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp29.htm. Carroll assumed GNP would be approximately $13
trillion in 2006. Id.
111. OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, DYNAMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 81, at 20 tbl.3.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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B. The Old View and the New View of Dividend Taxation
Because the analyses prepared by both the Administration and the
opponents of extending the tax cuts rarely focus on the economic im-
pact of the dividend tax cut alone, this Article will evaluate the divi-
dend tax cut in terms of its likely effects in both the short run and the
long run. To do this, it is necessary to understand two different views
of dividend taxation that have developed in corporate finance and ec-
onomics-the old view and the new view.114 The theories were devel-
oped to explain why corporations would distribute dividends, which
were taxed more heavily as ordinary*income than long-term capital
gains on retained earnings.115
1. The Old View
Under the old view, corporations obtain marginal funds for invest-
ment by issuing new shares, so they must distribute dividends to at-
tract shareholders.1 16 Dividends offer non-tax benefits, such as
signaling a firm's profitability and restricting managerial discretion,
and the old view assumes that "firms [will] pay dividends until the tax
cost on the last dollar of dividends paid exactly equals the non-tax
benefit. 11 7 The old view predicts that when the tax burden on divi-
dends declines relative to capital gains, corporations will increase their
dividend payments." 8
The old view also holds that a reduction in the dividend tax rate
would lower the user cost of capital' 19 and thus increase investment
and capital formation. 120 While share prices could rise in the short
114. The old view is frequently referred to as the traditional view, while the new view is some-
times referred to as the "trapped equity" or "tax capitalization" view. See Steven A. Bank,
Dividends and Tax Policy in the Long Run 28-29 (Am. Law & Econ. Ass'n, Working Paper No.
8, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=886583.
115. Robert Carroll et al., The Effect of Dividend Tax Relief on Investment Incentives, 56
NAT'L TAX J. 629, 632 (2003).
116. Bank, supra note 114, at 29-30.
117. Id. at 31.
118. Id.
119. Economists William Gale and Peter Orszag define the user cost of capital as "the mini-
mum rate of return a corporation needs on an investment to break even-that is, to cover the
costs of the asset's depreciation, to pay the associated taxes on the investment, and to compen-
sate the investors for the funds they provide." William G. Gale & Peter Orszag, Deficits, Interest
Rates, and the User Cost of Capital: A Reconsideration of the Effects of Tax Policy on Investment
1-2 (Urban-Brookings Tax Pol'y Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 27, 2005), available at http://www.
urban.org/UploadedPDF/311211_TPCDiscussionPaper_27.pdf [hereinafter Gale & Orszag, The
User Cost of Capital].
120. See Alan J. Auerbach & Kevin A. Hassett, Dividend Taxes and Firm Valuation: New
Evidence, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 119, 119 (2006); Gale & Orszag, The User Cost of Capital, supra
note 119, at 1.
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run, a lower marginal return on the increased capital would suffi-
ciently offset the dividend tax reduction, and share prices would re-
turn to their equilibrium level.1 21
2. The New View
Under the new view, retained earnings-rather than new shares-
provide the marginal funds for investment. 122 The new view holds
that "dividends offer no non-tax benefits," but are "the only means of
distributing funds to shareholders." 123 In addition, "all profits of the
firm will eventually be distributed to the shareholders and be subject"
to the dividend tax. 124 Therefore, the cost of the dividend tax is capi-
talized into the firm's share price.12 5
If the dividend tax rate were reduced, the new view predicts that the
reduced tax rate would neither lower the cost of capital nor increase
the amount of investment. 126 Furthermore, share prices would rise
because the previously capitalized dividend taxes would be elimi-
nated, resulting in a one-time windfall to the existing shareholders.12 7
With respect to dividends, the new view would not predict any change
in payout policies as a result of a permanent rate cut.'2 8 On the other
121. Auerbach & Hassett, supra note 120, at 119.
122. Id.
123. Carroll et al., supra note 115, at 632.
124. Bank, supra note 114, at 33.
125. See id.
126. See Auerbach & Hassett, supra note 120, at 119.
127. Carroll et al., supra note 115, at 638.
128. See id. at 633; Bank, supra note 114, at 33-34. Professor Bank offers an excellent exam-
ple, derived from an American Law Institute report, to illustrate that shareholders would be
indifferent between receiving a dollar of dividends today and a future dividend equal to the
dollar plus the amount earned on that dollar. Id. at 34-36. He assumes that "a corporation has
$100 in post-tax earnings in Year 1." Id. at 34. The corporation could distribute the $100 cur-
rently, or retain the $100 for investment and distribute both the $100 and the earnings from the
$100 at some point in the future. Id. The corporate and shareholder tax rates for both dividends
and ordinary income are assumed to be 30% and the pre-tax rate of return both inside and
outside the corporation is 10%. Id. If the corporation distributes the dividend currently, the
shareholders would receive $100 and pay $30 in tax, leaving the shareholders with $70 after tax.
Id. at 35. Each year, the shareholder would earn a 10% return before tax and 7% after tax.
Bank, supra note 114, at 35. To determine how much the shareholder would have accumulated
after tax at the end of ten years, the $70 would be multiplied by 1.0710. Id. & n.164. The share-
holder would have approximately $138 after tax at the end of ten years. Id. at 35.
If the corporation retained the $100, it would earn 10% before tax and 7% after tax each year.
Id. at 34-35. To determine how much the corporation would have after ten years, the $100
would be multiplied by 1.070. Id. at 35 & n.164. The corporation would have accumulated $197
at the end of ten years. Id. at 34-35. Assuming it distributed the $197, the shareholders would
have to pay a 30% tax, or slightly over $59, and would have approximately $138 after tax. Bank,
supra note 114, at 35. Thus, the shareholders should be indifferent between the two options and
the dividend tax rate should not affect dividend payout policies as long as it is permanent. Id. at
34.
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hand, the new view would foresee an increase in dividend payments if
the dividend tax rate was reduced temporarily. 129
3. The Prevailing View?
Each view has its theoretical drawbacks. Critics of the old view
point out that, contrary to its assumption about the marginal source of
investment funds, corporations rarely issue new shares.130 On the
other hand, in light of the widespread practice of repurchasing shares,
many economists dismiss the new view because it assumes that firms
must pay dividends to distribute their profits. 131 Empirical studies
have not been able to settle the debate. 132 This is especially true of
the studies conducted to determine the response of dividend payments
and share prices to the 2003 dividend tax cut. Even if there was a
consensus that dividend payments increased as a result of the tax cut,
the issue of the old view versus the new view would still be un-
resolved. 133 As discussed above, an increase in dividend payments in
129. See Bank, supra note 114, at 35-36. This can be illustrated by making one minor modifi-
cation to the example in note 128. The tax rate on dividends is assumed to be 30% for Years 1-9
and then increased to 50% for Year 10. Id. at 35. It is also assumed that all parties are aware of
this rate increase at the beginning of Year 1. Id. If the corporation distributes the $100 to the
shareholders at the beginning of Year 1, then the shareholders would still have $138 as in the
previous example. Id. If the corporation were to retain the $100 and invest it to earn 10%
before tax and 7% after tax, it still would have accumulated $197 at the end of ten years. Id. at
35-36. But when the shareholders receive the $197, they would have to pay tax of $98.50, or
50% of the $197. Id. at 36. The shareholders would be left with $98.50. Bank, supra note 114, at
36. In this case, the shareholders would prefer to have the corporation distribute the dividend in
any of the years prior to Year 10 when the tax rate increases. Id. at 35-36. Thus a temporary
change in dividend tax rates, 30% for nine years in this case, could affect the amount of divi-
dends paid, even under the new view.
130. See Carroll et al., supra note 115, at 633; Bank, supra note 114, at 33.
131. See Carroll et al., supra note 115, at 633; Bank, supra note 114, at 37-38.
132. Carroll et al., supra note 115, at 633.
133. There is no consensus as to the tax cut's impact on dividend payouts. Professor James
Poterba determined that the long-run level of dividends would increase by 31% above the 2002
level as a result of JGTRRA, but, under his model, only one-quarter of this effect should have
occurred three years after the tax cut. Poterba, supra note 90, at 174. Professors Raj Chetty and
Emmanuel Saez estimated that "nonfinancial, nonutility public corporations increased [their div-
idend payments] by 20 percent within six quarters after the reform." Raj Chetty & Emmanuel
Saez, Dividend Taxes and Corporate Behavior: Evidence from the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut, 120
Q.J. ECON. 791, 828 (2005). Chetty and Saez also noted that the dividend response occurred
more quickly than would have been projected under the old view, which envisions a supply-side
response leading to increased business activity and dividends in the long run. Id.
Professor Jennifer Blouin and her colleagues found that there was an increase in the amount
and frequency of regular quarterly dividends following the enactment of JGTRRA. Jennifer L.
Blouin et al., The Initial Impact of the 2003 Reduction in the Dividend Tax Rate 15 (Oct. 2004)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=462542. However, because they
could not find a strong relationship between changes in dividend payouts and corporations with
a high percentage of shares held by individuals or corporate insiders, the authors could not
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response to a temporary dividend tax cut would be possible under the
new view as well as the old view. 34
Turning to studies of stock prices, Professor Alan Auerbach and
Economist Kevin Hassett found that the dividend tax cut significantly
affected equity markets; some firms behaved in conformity with the
new view, while other firms behaved consistently with the old view.1
3 5
Mature firms (those firms that pay dividends and rarely issue shares)
experienced increases in share prices without a reduction in the cost of
capital, which is consistent with the new view.1 36 The tax cut appeared
to encourage these firms to pay dividends rather than to increase in-
vestment.1 37 But immature firms (those that had never paid a divi-
dend) and dividend-paying firms likely to issue new shares saw their
share prices increase, and may have experienced a reduction in their
cost of capital that encouraged them to invest.1 38 'This response is con-
sistent with the old view. 139
4. Tax Policy Implications
So what are the implications of the old and new views for tax pol-
icy? If the old view more accurately reflects corporate behavior, a
reduction in the dividend tax rate should lower the cost of capital for
the corporate sector and increase investment. Furthermore, as the
cost of capital is lowered for the corporate sector, capital should be
more efficiently allocated between the corporate and noncorporate
sectors, resulting in gains for the economy. 40 If the new view is the
more accurate model, however, a reduction in the dividend tax rate
would have no effect on either the corporate sector's cost of capital or
investment. 14  In addition, if the dividend tax has no effect on the
corporate sector's cost of capital, there would be no reallocation of
capital between sectors and no efficiency gains. 142 The U.S. economy
conclude the increased payouts were related to the tax rate reductions rather than nontax factors
such as an expanding economy. Id. at 21, 26.
Researcher Brandon Julio and Professor David Ikenberry determined that the dividend tax
cut could only partly explain increased dividend payouts after JGTRRA because dividends had
begun to rebound two to three years before any discussion of the tax cut. Brandon Julio &
David L. Ikenberry, Reappearing Dividends, 16 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 89, 93-95 (2004).
134. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
135. Auerbach & Hassett, supra note 120, at 123.
136. Id. at 119-20, 123.
137. Id. at 120.
138. Id. at 122-23.
139. Id. at 123.
140. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
142. Alan J. Auerbach & Kevin A. Hassett, On the Marginal Source of Investment Funds, 87 J.
PuB. ECON. 205, 206 (2002).
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might be a hybrid of old view and new view firms; there could be some
old view firms increasing investment and efficiency gains from the re-
allocation of capital among sectors as a result of the dividend tax cut.
C. The Short-Term Effects of the Dividend Tax Cut
The Treasury Department has claimed that the dividend and capital
gains tax cuts have significantly contributed to growth in real private
nonresidential investment and GDP since the passage of JGTRRA.143
Because the Treasury Department has offered little actual data to sup-
port this claim, one must use economic theory and literature to evalu-
ate its merits.
1. Theory of Short-Term Economic Stimulus
To stimulate economic growth in the short run, fiscal policy must
increase aggregate demand, which is the sum of consumption, invest-
ment, and government spending. 144 With this objective in mind, three
broad propositions are useful in selecting among policy alternatives.
First, the most direct and effective way to increase aggregate demand
is to increase government spending on goods and services. 45 Second,
if tax cuts for individuals are used, then cuts aimed at lower-income
individuals will be more effective than cuts targeting higher-income
individuals, because the former group saves at a lower rate and spends
a higher proportion of the cut. 146 Third, tax subsidies and corporate
tax cuts used to encourage investment spending will be effective only
if they require new spending to obtain the subsidy or make new in-
vestments more profitable. 147
2. Application of the Theory to the Dividend Tax Cut
Measured against these standards, the dividend tax cut is a poor
short-term stimulus. Higher income individuals have received the
bulk of qualified dividends. 148 The savings rate for taxpayers in the
143. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
144. See JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONG., DIVIDEND TAX
RELIEF: EFECrs ON ECONOMIC RECOVERY, LONG-TERM GROWTH, AND THE STOCK MARKET 1
(last updated June 2, 2006) (Order Code RL31824) [hereinafter GRAVELLE, DIVIDEND TAX
RELIEF].
145. Id. at 1-2.
146. Id. at 2.
147. JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., LIBRARY OF CONG., TAX CUTS AND ECO-
NOMIC STIMULUS: How EFFECTIVE ARE THE ALTERNATIVES? 2 (last updated Jan. 13, 2006)
(Order Code RS21126) [hereinafter GRAVELLE, TAX CUTS].
148. For a discussion of the distribution of qualified dividends among various income levels,
see infra Part V.
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top 10% of the income distribution scale is more than ten times the
rate in the bottom 20% of the scale, and is almost three times the rate
of the average for all taxpayers. 149 It appears unlikely that the divi-
dend tax cut has been very effective in increasing consumption.
150
It also appears unlikely that the dividend tax cut did much to spur
investment spending. The investment stimulus is indirect, with the tax
benefit going to the individual shareholder rather than the firm.
151
Further, the tax benefit goes largely to dividends paid out of earnings
on existing capital rather than earnings from new investment. 152 Fi-
nally, as Economists William Gale and Peter Orszag note, the effec-
tiveness of the dividend tax reduction with respect to investment
"depends on whether the old or new view holds."'1 53 The number of
firms falling under the new view could be quite significant, which
would have weakened the tax cut's ability to influence their invest-
ment decisions. 54
While the economy grew more rapidly after JGTRRA became law,
neither theory nor actual data can establish a causal link between the
dividend tax cut and such growth. Many other factors, such as the
Federal Reserve's expansive monetary policy that lowered interest
rates to historic lows and improved cash flows for businesses, might
explain the economy's improved performance since 2003.155
These conclusions are in accord with Gale and Orszag's "bang for
the buck" analysis.156 In weighing the effectiveness of tax cuts, they
consider the increase in national output obtained for each dollar of tax
revenue lost.157 When the dividend tax cut was being considered in
2003, it had a bang for the buck ratio of 0.10.158 Thus, the dividend tax
cut was expected to provide only ten cents in additional output for
each dollar of revenue lost.
149. GRAVELLE, TAX CUTs, supra note 147, at 3.
150. See GRAVELLE, DIVIDEND TAX RELIEF, supra note 144, at 2.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 2-3.
153. William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, An Economic Assessment of Tax Policy in the Bush
Administration, 2001-2004, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1157, 1214 (2004) [hereinafter Gale & Orszag, Eco-
nomic Assessment]. For the expected impact of the dividend tax cut on investment under the
two views, see supra notes 119-120, 126 and accompanying text.
154. See Carroll et al., supra note 115, at 633.
155. See AVIVA ARON-DINE & JOEL FRIEDMAN, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES. THE
CAPITAL GAINS AND DIVIDEND TAX CUTS AND THE ECONOMY: NEW TREASURY REPORT
PAINTS MISLEADING PICTURE 3-4 (2006), available at http://www.cbpp.org/3-27-06tax.pdf; Gale
& Orszag, Economic Assessment, supra note 153, at 1211-12.
156. See Gale & Orszag, Economic Assessment, supra note 153, at 1215-20.
157. Id. at 1215.
158. Id. at 1219.
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D. The Long-Term Effects of the Tax Cut
In the long run, economic policy aims to increase aggregate supply,
which is the quantity of goods and services the economy is capable of
producing on a sustainable basis.159 The key is to increase national
saving, which provides funds for investment in productive capital
stock such as equipment and structures. 16° The Bush Administration
maintains that lowering the dividend tax rate improves incentives for
saving and investment; this should ultimately result in higher output
and living standards.161 To support this claim, the Treasury Depart-
ment performed a dynamic analysis concluding that GNP would, in
the long run, be approximately $50 billion higher (in 2006 dollars)
each year as a result of extending both the dividend and capital gains
tax cuts. 16
2
To evaluate the Administration's position, this Section examines the
impact of the dividend tax cut, first on national saving and then on
investment. This Section concludes with a critique of the Treasury
Department's dynamic analysis. As discussed below, when the impact
of financing the tax cut with government debt is considered, the pros-
pects of the dividend tax cut for increasing saving, investment, and
output are far less promising than advertised by the Administration.
National saving would decline as a result of deficit-financed tax cuts.
Further, the interest rate on government debt would rise, increasing
the cost of capital for firms throughout the economy and actually low-
ering investment in the long run.
1. National Saving
Lowering the tax rate on dividends raises the after-tax return on
saving. As the after-tax reward for saving increases, some individuals
will be willing to increase their saving and reduce their consumption
pursuant to a so-called substitution effect. 163 But other individuals
would increase their consumption as a result of having higher after-tax
income, both now and in the future, under the so-called income ef-
159. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGETARY PROPOS-
ALS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 32 (2006), available at http://mirror2.cbo.gov/ftpdocs7oxx/
doc7069/03-14-PresidentsBudget.pdf [hereinafter CBO, PRESIDENT'S BUDGETARY PROPOSALS].
160. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ANALYZING THE ECONOMIC AND BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF
A 10 PERCENT CUT IN INCOME TAX RATES 3 (2005), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/
69xx/doc6908/12-01-lOPercentTaxCut.pdf.
161. OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, DYNAMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 81, at 1.
162. See supra notes 108-110 and accompanying text.
163. See CBO, PRESIDENT'S BUDGETARY PROPOSALS, supra note 159, at 34; OFFICE OF TAX
ANALYSIS, DYNAMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 81, at 9-10.
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fect. 164 The two effects largely offset each other, so the response of
saving to a tax change is generally expected to be small.165
But the increase in private saving explains only part of the effect on
national saving. If the government were to finance the tax cut by bor-
rowing, national saving would decline to the extent that the increase
in the deficit exceeded the increase in private saving.166 Economists
estimate that private saving would generally offset between 20% and
50% of an increase in the deficit. 167 Therefore, a deficit-financed tax
cut, such as the dividend tax cut enacted in 2003, would reduce na-
tional saving.' 68 The decline in national saving translates into lower
investment in capital stock, and ultimately to lower GDP and GNP.169
Economist Jane Gravelle's study of the President's dividend relief
proposal °70 is consistent with this analysis.171 Over a range of assump-
164. See CBO, PRESIDENT'S BUDGETARY PROPOSALS, supra note 159, at 34; OFFICE OF TAX
ANALYSIS, DYNAMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 81, at 10.
165. See CBO, PRESIDENT'S BUDGETARY PROPOSALS, supra note 159, at 34-35; GRAVELLE,
DIVIDEND TAX RELIEF, supra note 144, at 3.
166. See Gale & Orszag, Economic Assessment, supra note 153, at 1194-95, 1201-02.
167. Id. at 1195 & n.95.
168. Based on the OMB's revised revenue forecast in the Mid-session Review, some propo-
nents of the dividend tax cut argue that it is "paying for itself" and, therefore, is not deficit-
financed. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text. Such an argument is flawed in three
respects. First, each year, the CBO examines the effects of the President's budget on GNP and
other macroeconomic variables to determine whether those effects would improve or worsen the
projected deficit. See, e.g., CBO, PRESIDENT'S BUDGETARY PROPOSALS, supra note 159, at
29-43. The CBO's analyses typically indicate that only very modest changes to the projected
deficit would occur if the macroeconomic feedback were taken into account. For example, for
2012-2016, the cumulative deficit would range from $1181 billion to $1357 billion if the eco-
nomic effects are incorporated versus the $1351 billion projected under baseline economic as-
sumptions. See id. at 31 tbl.2.1.
Second, as noted by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, the Treasury's own dynamic
analysis reveals that if all of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts were extended as proposed, the revenues
resulting from the increase in economic growth would defray less than 10% of the conventional
cost estimate. KOGAN & ARON-DINE, supra note 100, at 4.
Finally, when the OMB revised its deficit projection for 2006, it estimated that compared to
the February 2006 forecast, total revenues would be 5% higher, while real GDP would be only
0.1% higher. Greg Ip & Deborah Solomon, As Bigger Piece of Economic Pie Shifts to Wealthi-
est, U.S. Deficit Heads Downward, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2006, at A2. As the revised GDP fore-
cast indicates, the improved revenue outlook was not a function of stronger-than-anticipated
growth. Id. Instead, the projection was primarily due to a greater than budgeted share of na-
tional income going to corporations and the wealthiest individuals, who typically pay income
taxes at higher rates. Id.
169. See Gale & Orszag, Economic Assessment, supra note 153, at 1194-95, 1201-02.
170. See GRAVELLE, DIVIDEND TAX RELIEF, supra note 144, at 1, 3. Gravelle states that
despite having different features, the dividend and capital gains tax cuts under JGTRRA and the
President's original proposal for eliminating double taxation are similar in overall magnitude,
and that the analysis of the effects of the President's proposal should "reflect the general effects
of the final enacted proposal, presuming the tax cuts are expected to become permanent." Id. at
171. See id. at 3-7.
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tions regarding the response of private saving, Gravelle found that the
dividend relief proposal would lower output (measured in terms of
income available for consumption) by small amounts over one-year,
five-year, ten-year, and twenty-year timeframes, as long as it was
based on deficit finance. 172 On the other hand, if the proposal were
offset with spending cuts starting in the year it was implemented, then
output would be unchanged over one-year and five-year timeframes
and would show very slight increases over ten-year and twenty-year
timeframes (0.03% and 0.05%, respectively)., 73 If eliminating the def-
icit by means of spending cuts were delayed for ten years, however,
output would decrease for thirty-six years.174
2. Investment
The cost a firm incurs to obtain funds for investment is known as
the cost of capital. In economic terms, it is the minimum rate of re-
turn a firm needs to cover the cost of the asset's depreciation, to pay
taxes associated with the investment, and to compensate investors for
providing funds.175 From this definition, it is clear that the cost of
capital depends upon tax provisions and the alternative rates of return
that providers of funds could achieve elsewhere in the economy.176
All things being equal, a tax rate reduction should lower the cost of
capital; this is the primary economic justification for enacting the divi-
dend tax cut.' 77
Economists capture the tax component of the cost of capital in a
formula known as the marginal effective total tax rate (METTR). The
rate is "the proportion of the investment's pre-tax return that is
needed to cover the tax cost" and includes taxes at both the company
and investor levels. 178 The Treasury Department claimed that the div-
idend and capital gains rate cuts had lowered the METTR on an econ-
omy-wide basis by 1.8 percentage points, from a pre-JGTRRA level
of 19.1% to 17.3%. 179 For the corporate sector of the economy, it
172. Id. at 3-4 & tbl.1.
173. Id. at 5, 6 tbl.3.
174. Id.
175. Gale & Orszag, The User Cost of Capital, supra note 119, at 1-2.
176. The alternative rates of return that can be earned on the funds are the opportunity costs
of those funds.
177. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INVESTING IN AMERICA'S FUTURE, supra note 7, at
3-6.
178. Carroll et al., supra note 115, at 634. The Treasury Department refers to the rate as the
marginal effective tax rate. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INVESTING IN AMERICA'S FUTURE,
supra note 7, at 4 & tbl.1.
179. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INVESTING IN AMERICA'S FUTURE, supra note 7, at 4 &
tbl.1. These figures are identical to those reported by Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Analy-
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reported a decline in the METTR from 33.5% to 29.4% as a result of
JGTRRA, while the rate in the noncorporate sector remained con-
stant at 20.0%.180
Based on these figures, it appears that in response to the reduced
tax rates, the overall cost of capital would decline and investment
would increase. As the gap in tax costs between the corporate and
noncorporate sectors narrowed, it also appears that capital would be
allocated more efficiently between the two sectors.
The Treasury Department's report does not isolate the effects of the
dividend tax cut from the capital gains tax cut. It is misleading in sev-
eral other respects. The first is that the Treasury Department derived
its estimates under the old view of dividend taxation rather than the
new view. 181 Because the new view assumes that the cost of capital is
not affected by changes in the dividend tax rate, the figures overstate
JGTRRA's impact on the METTR (and on the cost of capital as well)
to the extent that American firms fit within the new view.182
The differences between the old view and the new view affect not
only the expected increase in total investment, but also the realloca-
tion of capital among sectors. The Treasury Department indicated
that the efficiency gains from eliminating the bias against the corpo-
rate sector, as well as the corporate biases in favor of retaining earn-
ings and financing with debt, could increase national income by as
much as $43 billion (in 2005 dollars) per year in perpetuity. 183 It
noted that the dividend and capital gains tax cuts did not totally elimi-
nate double taxation, rendering the maximum gain unattainable.' 84
The potential gain could also have been significantly overstated, be-
cause new view firms are not placed at a competitive disadvantage for
capital by the dividend tax.' 85
sis at the Department of the Treasury Robert Carroll and his colleagues, in their study of the
dividend tax cut's impact on the METrR. See Carroll et al., supra note 115, at 636 tbl.1, 648
tbl.3.
A variety of factors beyond the scope of this Article cause the METTR to be significantly
lower than the top marginal statutory rates with respect to corporate taxable income. A major
factor is that pension funds and other tax-exempt shareholders own a substantial proportion of
the shares of American corporations. See Gale & Orszag, The User Cost of Capital, supra note
119, at 9. In studies on the cost of capital, that proportion is assumed to be 50%. Id.
180. U.S. DEFP'T OF THE TREASURY, INVESTING IN AMERICA'S FUTURE, supra note 7, at 4 &
tbl.1.
181. See OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, DYNAMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 81, at 4, 8; U.S. DEP'T OF
THE TREASURY, INVESTING IN AMERICA'S FUTURE, supra note 7, at 9-10.
182. See supra notes 119-120, 126 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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The most serious drawback to the analysis is that it focuses solely on
the tax cost of investments and ignores the impact of the debt incurred
to finance the EGTRRA and JGTRRA tax cuts. As government debt
levels increase, interest rates on government debt (bonds) also in-
crease, and the higher interest rates mean higher opportunity costs to
investors who could buy the bonds.186 Investors then seek higher
rates of return from the firms to which they provide funds.187 As in-
vestors' required rates of return increase, so does the firms' cost of
capital. 188
In a study analyzing the effects of deficit-financed tax cuts on the
cost of capital, Gale and Orszag estimated that the federal debt would
increase by over $4.4 trillion from 2001 to 2014 as a result of extending
the tax cuts as proposed.189 The debt increase would be equal to
23.7% of GDP for 2014.190 Based on the estimate that real interest
rates rise by three basis points (or 0.03%) for every one percentage
point increase in the ratio of public debt to GDP, Gale and Orszag
determined that interest rates would rise by seventy-one basis points
(0.71%) by 2014.191
186. See supra notes 175-176 and accompanying text.
187. See Gale & Orszag, The User Cost of Capital, supra note 119, at 1, 6.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 7 & app. tbl.1. In addition to revenue losses and interest on additional debt associ-
ated with the enacted cuts, the estimate includes projected costs for providing relief from the
alternative minimum tax (AMT). See id. at 7. The AMT relief measures were not part of the
President's budget proposal. See id.
The AMT was enacted to prevent high-income taxpayers from taking advantage of various
deductions and credits in the Internal Revenue Code, and thus paying little or no income tax
under the regular income tax system. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM
TAX 1 (2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/53xx/doc5386/04-15-AMT.pdf [hereinafter
CBO, ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX]. Essentially, taxpayers calculate their income tax liability
under two systems, the regular tax system and the AMT system, and pay the higher of the two
liabilities. Id. at 1-2. In calculating the AMT liability, individual taxpayers do not get to deduct
amounts for personal exemptions, state and local taxes, unreimbursed business expenses, and
other miscellaneous itemized deductions. See I.R.C. § 56(b) (West 2006). In addition, for tax
years beginning after 2006, they are limited as to the use of nonrefundable personal credits to
offset AMT liability. See id. § 26(a); Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-222, § 302(a), 120 Stat. 345, 353 (2006). While only one million taxpayers were
affected by the AMT in 2001, that number is expected to grow to approximately thirty million in
2010, absent any relief provisions for tax years after 2006 enacted by Congress. CBO, ALTERNA-
TIVE MINIMUM TAX, supra, at 2. In 2010, the group owing tax under the AMT system would
encompass 20% of all taxpayers and 40% of all married taxpayers. Id. Gale and Orszag believe
that it is highly unlikely that Congress will permit the AMT to ensnare so many taxpayers, and
therefore, included cost estimates of what it would take each year in the budget window to "keep
the number of AMT taxpayers the same as it would have been under pre-EGTRRA law." Gale
& Orszag, Economic Assessment, supra note 153, at 1165-66.
190. Gale & Orszag, The User Cost of Capital, supra note 119, at 10 & tbl.2.
191. Id.
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In keeping with traditional studies, Gale and Orszag found that
when they ignored the higher interest rate on government bonds, the
tax cuts lowered the cost of capital in all twenty-four cases they ex-
amined. 192 But when they incorporated the higher interest rate, they
found that the tax cuts raised the cost of capital in twenty-two of
twenty-four cases.193 Thus, the effect of the increased deficit and
higher interest rate outweighed the "effects of reductions in marginal
tax rates," and the net effect of the tax cuts was to raise the cost of
capital. 194 The implication is that the deficit-financed tax cuts would
reduce investment and long-term economic growth by raising the cost
of capital. 195
The data in Gale and Orszag's study are now two years old. But
recent reports suggest that the authors would draw similar conclusions
if the study were conducted today. The Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities (CBPP) has estimated the increase in federal debt due to the
enacted and extended tax cuts at $6.5 trillion over the period
2001-2016.196 That level of debt would be 31% of the $20.8 trillion in
GDP projected for 2016 by the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO). 1 9 7 Consequently, the interest rate on government bonds
would be expected to increase by ninety-three basis points (0.93%) by
2016.198 The higher interest rate would likely raise the cost of capital
as it did in Gale and Orszag's study.
While the dividend tax cut would contribute only a fraction of the
$6.5 trillion to the federal debt,1 99 it seems highly unlikely that the
192. Id. at 11 & tbl.3. The twenty-four cases resulted from altering the mix of debt and equity
to finance projects, whether the firm was an old or new view firm, etc. Id. at 8 & tbl.3.
193. Id. at 11 & tbl.3.
194. Id. at 11.
195. Gale & Orszag, The User Cost of Capital, supra note 119, at 13.
196. See generally JOEL FRIEDMAN & AVIVA ARON-DINE, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORI-
TIES, EXTENDING EXPIRING TAX CUTS AND AMT RELIEF WOULD COST $3.3 TRILLION
THROUGH 2016 (2006), available at http://www.cbpp.org/2-6-06tax.pdf. The estimate includes in-
terest costs associated with higher debt and $914 billion in revenue losses associated with ex-
tending AMT relief; no AMT relief provisions were included in the President's proposed fiscal
year 2007 budget. Id. at 1 n.1, 7.
197. CBO, PRESIDENT'S BUDGETARY PROPOSALS, supra note 159, at 4 tbl.1-2.
198. See supra notes 190-191 and accompanying text.
199. For 2007-2016, the CBPP estimated the cost of making tax cuts permanent at $3.3 tril-
lion, which included AMT-related revenue losses of $914 billion. See supra note 196. Over the
same period, the JCT estimated the revenue loss connected with making the dividend tax and
capital gains tax cuts permanent at $129.5 billion and $67.6 billion, respectively. See JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS, supra note 6, at 314. The CBO
incorporated the JCT estimates into its analysis of the 2007 budget, and projected the total reve-
nue cost of extending all of the tax cuts as proposed at $1545 billion. See CBO, PRESIDENT'S
BUDGETARY PROPOSALS, supra note 159, at 5 tbl.1-3. Thus, revenue losses for the budget win-
dow would total $2459 billion (including AMT relief), of which $129.5 billion, or 5.3%, would be
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dividend tax cut alone would be extended permanently while the
other EGTRRA and JGTRRA cuts would be allowed to expire by
2010.200 Therefore, a substantial increase in the federal deficit is a
realistic scenario, and its ramifications must be weighed before perma-
nently extending the dividend tax cut and the other EGTRRA and
JGTRRA tax cuts. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that lower-
ing the dividend tax rate would lower the cost of capital and spur in-
vestment and economic growth, an extension of the dividend tax cut
and other EGTRRA and JGTRRA cuts would actually raise the cost
of capital and dampen investment and economic growth.
3. Dynamic Analysis
The Treasury Department's dynamic analysis indicates that, if the
dividend and capital gains tax cuts were financed with spending reduc-
tions commencing ten years after they were extended, GNP would be
0.4% higher in the long run.20' That increase translates into a gain in
GNP of approximately $50 billion per year (in 2006 dollars) in
perpetuity.20 2 Once again, the analysis blurs the issue as to the divi-
dend tax cut's contribution to long-term economic growth. The study
is also unreliable as to the dividend tax cut's impact because it rests on
two highly questionable assumptions.
First, the Treasury Department's model assumes that the old view
of dividend taxation applies,20 3 despite its acknowledgment that the
market could be "segmented . . . with some firms behaving in a man-
ner consistent with the traditional view and other firms behaving in a
manner consistent with the new view. '20 4 New view firms would not
alter their investment in response to a dividend tax cut.20 5 And be-
cause capital would not be reallocated from the noncorporate sector
to new view firms, there would be no efficiency gain.20 6 Therefore, to
attributable to the dividend tax cut. Excluding the AMT cost, the dividend tax cut would ac-
count for 8.4% of the revenue loss.
200. The EGTRRA tax cuts are set to expire on December.31, 2010. Pub. L. No. 107-16,
§ 901(a), 115 STrAT. 38, 150 (2001). TIPRA extended the dividend tax and capital gains tax cuts
for two years so that they will also expire on December 31, 2010. See supra note 5 and accompa-
nying text.
201. See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text. The Treasury's dynamic analysis also
shows an increase of 0.3% in GNP in the long term if the tax cuts are financed by raising taxes
commencing ten years after their extension. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
204. OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, DYNAMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 81, at 8.
205. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. The Treasury states that the model it uses
captures the economic effects of the reallocation of capital that would occur after reducing
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the extent the new view accurately models corporate behavior, the
growth estimate is overstated.20 7
Second, the model also unrealistically assumes that, starting in 2017
(the first year after the ten-year budget window), government spend-
ing would be cut in order to maintain the debt-to-GNP ratio at the
level that would exist in 2017.208 To satisfy this assumption, if all the
tax cuts were extended as proposed, the CBPP estimates that govern-
ment spending would have to be lowered "by the equivalent of about
1.3% of GDP after 2017. ' '209 The CBPP states that such a reduction
would be the equivalent of "cutting domestic discretionary spending
in half.1210 Spending cuts of this magnitude hardly seem feasible in
our political and economic climate.211 Accordingly, the Treasury De-
partment should have assumed a longer timeframe for financing the
tax cuts to provide a more credible estimate of their impact on eco-
nomic growth.212 Because delays in financing tax cuts negatively im-
pact economic growth, applying a longer but more realistic timeframe
for financing the tax cuts is likely to reveal that the dividend and capi-
tal gains tax cuts lower economic growth in the long run.2 13
V. THE COST OF THE DIVIDEND TAX CUT AND THE
DISTRIBUTION OF ITS BENEFITS
Two issues that lawmakers generally consider before enacting a tax
cut are its cost and the distribution of its benefits among various
groups of taxpayers. Each of these factors militates against making
the dividend tax cut permanent; they will be considered in turn.
double taxation of corporate income. OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, DYNAMIC ANALYSIS, supra
note 81, at 7.
207. See supra notes 181-185 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
209. JASON FURMAN, CTR. ON BUDGET POL'Y & PRIORITIES, TREASURY DYNAMIC SCORING
ANALYSIS REFUTES CLAIMS BY SUPPORTERS OF THE TAX CUTS 4 (2006), available at http://www.
cbpp.org/7-27-06tax.pdf.
210. Id.
211. For a discussion of the impact of financing tax cuts with cuts in government spending on
the distribution of the tax cuts' benefits among various income groups, see infra Part V.B.
212. For example, when the CBO conducts its macroeconomic analysis of the President's
budget proposals, it assumes that the financing of the tax cuts would begin the year after the ten-
year budget window, which is 2017 in this case, and would be phased in over the ten-year period
from 2017-2026. CBO, PRESIDENT'S BUDGETARY PROPOSALS, supra note 159, at 39-41; OFFICE
OF TAX ANALYSIS, DYNAMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 81, at 7 n.9. This would allow the debt-to-
GNP ratio to rise further after 2017. Id.
213. See FURMAN, supra note 209, at 5-6.
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A. Cost-
The cost of the dividend tax cut would hamper efforts at reducing
the massive federal deficit over the next decade. The JCT has esti-
mated the cost of permanently extending the dividend tax cut at
$129.5 billion for the years 2007-2016.214 While the dividend tax cut
accounts for only 8.4% of the projected cost of extending all of the tax
cuts as proposed by the President, its cost is nevertheless substan-
tial.215 Further, because the dividend tax cut was set to expire on De-
cember 31, 2008 when the JCT estimate was prepared, 16 the bulk of
the revenue loss was projected to occur during 2012-2016, averaging
$20 billion per year.217 This annual $20 billion cost would be incurred
at a time when the government would have to deal with shortfalls in
the Social Security and Medicare Trust Funds, as well as deficits accu-
mulated in this decade as a result of the EGTRRA and JGTRRA tax
cuts. 21 8 Given the cost estimates and the unfavorable fiscal climate
the government will likely face, permanently extending the dividend
tax cut is unsound policy. Justifying the cost of the dividend tax cut
becomes even more difficult after considering the issue of who bene-
fits from it.
B. Who Benefits from the Dividend Tax Cut?
As evidence that the tax cut is being enjoyed by taxpayers at all
income levels, the Treasury Department states that 73% of the taxpay-
ers who reported qualified dividends on their 2004 tax returns had
incomes below $100,000.219 However, as the Treasury Department
214. See supra note 199.
215. See id.
216. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
217. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS, supra note 6,
at 314. While the cost would average $20 billion per year, it would grow steadily from $17.1
billion in 2012 to $22.7 billion in 2016. Id. When TIPRA was passed, the JCT scored the cost of
extending the cut for two years, through December 31, 2010, at $30.8 billion. JOINT COMM. ON'
TAXATION, ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR THE "TAX
INCREASE PREVENTION AND RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2005" 1 (2006), available at http://www.
house.gov/jct/x-18-06.pdf. The JCT has not prepared a new score for extending the cut beyond
2010. TIPRA was expected to have virtually no effect after 2012, however, so a projection that
the cut would cost $20 billion per year appears reasonable. See id.
218. See Gale & Orszag, Economic Assessment, supra note 153, at 1166-78. As far as the
deficit accumulation due to tax cuts is concerned, the Administration claims that the tax cuts
have "allowed taxpayers to keep $1.1 trillion more of their own money over the past six years."
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 80, at 4. Separately, the CBPP reported the direct cost
of tax cuts enacted since 2001 as totaling $1.0 trillion through 2006. FRIEDMAN & ARON-DINE,
supra note 196, 2, 3 tbl.1. The direct cost excludes interest on debt incurred to finance the tax
cuts. Id.
219. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INVESTING IN AMERICA'S FUTURE, supra note 7, at 11.
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notes, only 18.5% of all taxpayers reported qualified dividends, indi-
cating that the benefits of the tax cut were not widespread. 220 In fact,
further examination of the 2004 data reveals that taxpayers who filed
1.7% of all returns, and whose adjusted gross incomes exceeded
$200,000, reported 55% of the total qualified dividends.221 The group
of taxpayers cited by the Treasury Department, while accounting for
73% of the returns reporting qualified dividends, received only 27.9%
of the total dollar amount of qualified dividends.222 The 2004 tax re-
turn data lead to only one conclusion: the dividend tax cut is highly
skewed in favor of high-income individuals.223
As Gale and Orszag point out, however, thesb statistics do not tell
the whole story. Lower-income individuals may not currently benefit
from the tax cut because they are not receiving any dividends. But
when the time comes for the government to finance the tax cut, they
are likely to be worse off.224 This is true whether the tax cut is fi-
nanced with "equal-dollar" or "lump-sum" financing, which corre-
sponds to cuts in government spending, or with "proportional
financing," which corresponds to a combination of spending cuts and
progressive tax increases.225 In their study of the 2005 budget, Gale
and Orszag found that under either financing method, after-tax in-
come for the bottom four quintiles of the income distribution would
be lower as a result of making all of the proposed tax cuts perma-
nent. 226 Only the top quintile would see an increase in after-tax
income. 227
The gap between the highest and lowest quintiles in terms of per-
centage change in after-tax income is much greater when the equal-
dollar financing method is used. Under the equal-dollar method, tax-
payers in the lowest quintile would suffer a 21.7% decline in after-tax
220. Id.
221. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STATISTICS OF INCOME, TAX YEAR 2004 PRELIMINARY
DATA 25 tbl.1, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soil04inplim.pdf. The percentages were
calculated by the author. As many of these taxpayers would have been in marginal tax brackets
of 28% or higher, their tax on qualified dividends would have declined by more than 10 percent-
age points. Therefore, their share of the tax cut would have been even greater than their share
of qualifying dividends.
222. Id.
223. The data for 2003 yield comparable statistics. For example, taxpayers who filed 1.4% of
all individual returns and had adjusted gross incomes in excess of $200,000 reported 50.6% of all
qualified dividends for 2003. See MICHAEL PARISI & ScoTr HOLLENBECK, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., STATISTICS OF INCOME, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS, 2003, at 25 tbl.1, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/03indtr.pdf. The percentages were calculated by the author.
224. See Gale & Orszag, Economic Assessment, supra note 153, at 1186-92, 1243-44 tbls.7-8.
225. Id. at 1190.
226. Id. at 1190-91, 1243-44 tbls.7-8.
227. Id.
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income on average as a result of the tax cuts, while taxpayers in the
highest quintile would see their after-tax income increase by 3.1% on
average. 228 Under the proportional method, after-tax income for tax-
payers in the lowest quintile would decrease by 2.4% on average,
while after-tax income for taxpayers in the highest quintile would in-
crease by 0.7% on average. 229
Aviva Aron-Dine and her colleagues from the CBPP examined the
distribution of the TIPRA tax cuts assuming the same two financing
methods. They found, on average, that the top quintile experienced
an increase in after-tax income while the other four quintiles saw a
decline in after-tax income. 230 In addition, they found the disparity
between the highest and lowest quintiles to be significantly greater
when the equal-dollar method was used. 231
The studies by Gale and Orszag and Aron-Dine illustrate two im-
portant lessons about dividend tax relief and other EGTRRA and
JGTRRA tax cuts. First, when financing is considered, it is clear that
taxpayers in the highest quintile reap a disproportionate share of the
benefits, and that taxpayers in the bottom four quintiles are actually
transferring resources to those in the highest quintile. 232 Further, us-
ing government spending cuts to finance the tax cuts will result in a
significantly larger transfer of resources from the lowest quintile to
the highest quintile than a financing method that combines spending
cuts with progressive tax increases.
Whether one examines statistical data based on filed income tax re-
turns or considers who benefits after taking the government's financ-
ing method into account, it is apparent that the dividend tax cut favors
taxpayers at the highest income levels. Extending a tax cut that bene-
fits the rich without promoting economic growth is unsound from a
policy perspective.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
In its present form, the dividend tax cut is a deficient mechanism for
achieving the integration of the corporate and individual income tax
228. Id. at 1243 tbl.7. Taxpayers in the top 0.1%, top 0.5%, and top 1% of the income distri-
bution would see their after-tax incomes rise by 7.4%, 6.7%, and 6.2%, respectively.
229. Id. at 1244 tbl.8. Taxpayers in the top 0.1%, top 0.5%, and top 1% of the income distri-
bution would see their after-tax incomes rise by 3.5%, 3.0%, and 2.5%, respectively.
230. See generally AVIVA ARON-DINE ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET POLICIES & PRIORITIES, CON-
TRARY TO PRESIDENT'S CLAIM, LARGE MAJORITY OF AMERICANS ULTIMATELY ARE LIKELY TO
LOSE FROM TAX RECONCILIATION BILL 2-4, 5 tbl.1 (2006), available at http://www.cbpp.org/5-
17-06tax.pdf.
231. Id.
232. Gale & Orszag, Economic Assessment, supra note 153, at 1191.
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systems, because it does not ensure that income will be taxed fully at
least once.2 33 Nor can the dividend tax cut be justified in terms of its
positive impact on economic growth-either in the short run or the
long run. There is no evidence of a causal link between the dividend
tax cut and the economy's improved performance since 2003, and eco-
nomic theory suggests that the deficit-financed tax cut will actually
lower economic growth in the long run.2 34 Therefore, the dividend tax
cut should be allowed to expire.
Despite this recommendation, integration may still be an appropri-
ate policy goal. Whether integration should be implemented, how-
ever, is a question that cannot be answered until its costs and benefits
have been carefully identified and assessed. Since the revenue loss
associated with an integration proposal similar to the President's 2004
budget proposal would be substantial, it should be quantified. 235 Fur-
ther, the anticipated gains from increased investment and efficient al-
location of capital would have to be evaluated in light of the
proportion of old view and new view firms in the economy.236
Assuming that the benefits of integration are found to outweigh its
costs, integration could be accomplished relatively easily with a modi-
fication of the President's 2004 budget proposal. The modification
would be to return to the dividend exclusion prototype in the Treasury
Department's 1992 study.2 37 Companies would still keep track of the
EDA.2 38 But unlike the President's proposal, if a corporation chose to
distribute less than the EDA, the corporation could carry the unused
balance over to future years. 239 This would eliminate the need for the
corporation either to distribute all of the EDA each year, or to advise
shareholders to adjust the basis of their stock to consume the EDA.
The requirement in the President's proposal that corporations keep
track of basis adjustments in a CREBA account would be
eliminated.240
233. See supra Part III.
234. See supra Part IV.
235. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 181-185 and accompanying text.
237. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE, supra note 25, at
17-25.
238. Id. The dividend exclusion prototype called for an excludable distribution account rather
than an excludable dividend amount.
239. Id. In the dividend exclusion prototype, unused EDA amounts could be carried over to
future years.
240. Firms could opt for a dividend reinvestment plan. Under such a plan, the firm could be
deemed to make a distribution up to the balance of its EDA. The shareholder would exclude the
amount of the deemed distribution from gross income, but then would adjust the basis of the
stock as advised by the corporation. See id. at 24, 87-88.
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The resulting proposal is much simpler than the President's original
one. Shareholders would exclude distributions from their gross in-
come up to the amount of the balance in the EDA. Distributions
would reduce the EDA on a dollar-for-dollar basis, but not below
zero. If firms made distributions in excess of the balance in the EDA,
the shareholders would treat them as ordinary dividend income. 241
Keeping track of the excludable amounts and the ordinary dividends
would not burden the current dividend reporting system under Form
1099.
VII. CONCLUSION
Permanently extending the dividend tax cut would represent a ma-
jor failure in tax policy. It would not accomplish the goal of integra-
tion to tax income fully only once, nor would it promote economic
growth and well-being as proponents claim. Instead, it would be a
costly tax break that would benefit taxpayers in the highest quintile of
the income distribution. Accordingly, the dividend tax cut should be
allowed to expire.
241. They would be treated as dividends to the extent the corporation had current or accumu-
lated earnings and profits. See I.R.C. § 316(a)(1)-(2) (West 2006).
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